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SEC RELEASE 1092 ON THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS
ACT OF 1940: APPLICABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT TO FINANCIAL PLANNERS AND
OTHER PERSONS WHO PROVIDE FINANCIAL
SERVICES
Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940' (Advisers Act)
to protect persons who rely on investment advisers for advice on purchasing
and selling securities. 2 The Advisers Act broadly defines an investment
adviser as any person who, either directly or through writings, engages in
the business of advising others on the value or profitability of securities
and receives compensation. 3 The Advisers Act protects investors by requiring
all persons who qualify under the Act as investment advisers to register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).4 The Advisers Act,
however, specifies six classes of persons who are not investment advisers
and exempts three classes of investment advisers from the Act's registration

1. 15 U.S.C.

§

80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982).

2. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Report]
(discussing need for national regulation of investment companies and investment advisers); H.
REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 27-28 (1940) [hereinafter House Report] (same). The
House and Senate reports on the Advisers Act reflect a concern that unscrupulous and
unqualified investment counselors controlled huge amounts of capital. Senate Report, supra,
at 21; House Report, supra, at 28. Congress, therefore, enacted the Advisers Act to protect
the integrity of the securities market and the financial security of individual investors. Senate
Report, supra, at 21; House Report, supra, at 28.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982) (broadly defining term "investment adviser"
under Advisers Act). Throughout this note, the term "investment adviser" refers only to
persons that satisfy the Advisers Act's definition in section 202(a)(11). See infra notes 34-38
and accompanying text (discussing SEC's use of term "investment adviser"). The term
"financial planner" refers to a person that provides any type of financial advice but not
necessarily a person that qualifies as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act. See infra
notes 39-44 (describing typical activities of financial planners).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982) (requiring investment advisers to register with
Securities and Exchange Commission); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (observing that Congress enacted Securities laws in 1930's
to replace philosophy of caveat emptor with full disclosure in securities market); S. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1933) (discussing disclosure requirement that would pervade
securities laws of 1930's). In addition to the Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act,
Congress enacted four other securities acts during the 1930's. Id.; see Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7711 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (regulating initial distribution of securities
offered to public through interstate commerce); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (regulating trading on national securities markets); Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(regulating financing and operations of public utility holding companies); Trust Indenture Act
of 1939 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982) (providing for independent trustees to protect rights
of holders of indenture securities).
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requirements.5 Nevertheless, the SEC staff has interpreted the Act's definition of an investment adviser broadly and has caused persons who provide
many types of investment advice to question whether they must register
with the SEC pursuant to the Advisers Act.6 The SEC has attempted to
clarify the Advisers Act's definition of an investment adviser through noaction letters and releases. 7 Recently, the SEC issued a Release (Release
1092) that discusses the applicability of the Advisers Act to persons who
provide investment advice as a component of a variety of financial services.a
The SEC broadly defines the term "investment adviser" in Release 1092
to comport with the legislative history of the Advisers Act.9 The Advisers
Act originated from a report on investment trusts and investment companies
that Congress instructed the SEC to prepare in 1935.10 Congress planned to

5. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (A)-(F) (1982). Congress expressly exempted from the
definition of an investment adviser: banks, including bank holding companies that are not
investment companies; lawyers, engineers, accountants, and teachers whose performance of
investment advisory services is incidental to the practice of their main professions; brokers
and broker-dealers whose performance of investment advisory services is incidental to their
main businesses and that receive no separate compensation for investment advice; publishers
of news, business, and financial publications of general circulation; any person whose investment advice relates solely to securities in which the United States has an interest; and other
persons not within the intent of the Advisers Act as the SEC may later designate. Id. See
infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing classes of investment advisers that need not
register under Advisers Act).
6. See Gartenberg, Many Estate Planners Are Also Investment Advisers Required to
Register with the SEC, 14 EST. PLaN. 40, 40 (1987) [hereinafter Estate Planners] (suggesting
that defrmition of investment adviser covers virtually every person that receives compensation
for giving securities advice); supra note 3 and accompanying text (defining term "investment
adviser" under Advisers Act). Because the SEC has interpreted the term "investment adviser"
so broadly, Gartenberg warns that persons that counsel clients concerning any type of
investment may function as investment advisers under the Advisers Act. Estate Planners,supra,
at 45; see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)
(finding that Congress intended for courts and SEC to interpret provisions of Advisers Act
flexibly to avoid fraudulent conduct).
7. See Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation,
98 H~Auv. L. REv. 747, 793 (noting that most guidance on definition of investment adviser is
found in SEC no-action letters) [hereinafter Information Technology]. A no-action letter is a
letter written by a staff attorney stating that, given an existing set of facts, the attorney will
not advise the agency to take action because the facts do not warrant prosecution. BLACK'S
LAw DIcToNARuY 994 (5th ed. 1979). No-action letters do not prevent private citizens from
challenging investment advisory conduct under the Advisers Act. See infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text (discussing limited private causes of action available under Advisers Act).
8. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of
Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 1092, [Vol. 5] Sec.
Reg. (PH) 27,612.2 (October 8, 1987) [hereinafter Rel. No. 1092]. Rel. No. 1092 reflects
the views of the staff of the SEC Division of Investment Management. Id. at 27,555.
9. See infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Advisers
Act); Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 190 (1985) (same).
10. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (directing SEC to study investment trusts and investment companies and to report
back to Congress on or before January 4, 1937). The SEC delivered a report to Congress in

1988]

INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT

use the information that the SEC gathered to draft legislation to curtail
abuses in the securities industry that Congress believed were partially responsible for the stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the
1930's."1 The report that the SEC submitted to Congress focused on investment counseling services and the dangers that an ever-growing number
of unregulated investment counselors posed to unwary investors. 12 Both
Congress and the SEC, therefore, advocated legislation that would regulate
a broad class of persons who provide investment advice.' 3 Based on the
information in the SEC's report, Congress began work on a bill consisting4
of two titles that ultimately became the Investment Company Act of 1940

1939. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:
Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Supervisory, and Investment Advisory Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) [hereinafter SEC Report] (SEC
study of investment counseling services).
11. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963) (suggesting fraud by investment advisers contributed to stock market crash and
depression); Comment, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Supreme Court: Private
Rights of Action Under the New Cort Test, 6 DEL. J. Cos'. L. 54, 55-56 (1981) (discussing
abuses in which investors and investment advisers commonly engaged before 1929). The
commentator notes that some common abuses in the securities industry in the 1920's were
excessive use of credit by investors and manipulation of prices on the stock exchange by
investment advisers and corporate insiders. Id.
12. See SEC Report, supra note 10, at 27-30 (discussing abuses among investment
counselors and recognizing need for national regulation). The SEC noted, first, that investment
counselors that lacked training and financial responsibility plagued the securities market of the
1920's. Id. at 27-28. According to the SEC, these underqualified and unscrupulous investment
counselors endangered individual investors and the reputations of legitimate investment counselors by making exaggerated claims concerning investment opportunities. Id. at 28.
The SEC observed, second, that Congress should take action to eliminate conflicts of
interest between investment counselors and clients. Id. The SEC suggested that unregulated
investment bankers and securities brokers who earn money according to the investments that
they sell are not likely to give unbiased advice to their clients. Id. at 29. The SEC also
questioned whether unregulated corporate directors who provide investment advice to clients
could reconcile the duty of a director of the corporation with the duty of an investment
counselor to a client that holds stock in the same corporation. Id. According to the SEC,
investment counselors that recommended securities that their own clients issued also presented
a conflict of interest problem in the securities industry in the 1920's. Id. at 30.
The SEC suggested, finally, that Congress should enact regulations to protect investors
from insolvent investment counselors and counselors who fail to protect securities that clients
entrust to investment counselors. Id. According to the SEC, few states required investment
counselors to maintain a minimum cash balance or to submit to periodic audits. Id. The SEC
observed that a lack of government supervision enabled unscrupulous investment counselors
fraudulently to use clients' funds. Id.
13. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186195 (1963) (analyzing legislative history of Advisers Act and determining that Congress intended
for courts and SEC to interpret provisions of Advisers Act flexibly to avoid fraudulent
conduct); SEC Report, supra note 10, at 28 (recommending Congressional action to eliminate
-all types of fraud and conflict of interest in securities market); Senate Report, supra note 2,
at 21 (expressing alarm over potential for abuse posed by investment counseling industry that
controlled approximately $4,000,000,000 in private funds in 1939).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1982).
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and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.15 The House and Senate committees that worked on the bill heard extensive testimony from the investment counseling industry. 16 The committees designed the bill to protect both
investors and the reputations of legitimate investment advisers from the
activities of unscrupulous and incompetent securities practitioners. 17
Although Congress expressed lofty expectations, the original Advisers
Act limited the SEC's authority primarily to recording the number and
locations of investment advisers around the country.' 8 Congress, however,
has amended the Advisers Act to increase the ability of the SEC to monitor
and discipline investment advisers. 19 Section 206 of the Advisers Act prohibits
investment advisers from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
practices while acting in an advisory capacity. 20 Although section 206 fails
expressly to create civil liability, several federal courts have suggested that
section 206 impliedly creates a private cause of action for damages.2 1 The

15. Id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
16. See Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 195 (1981) (discussing testimony
during Senate hearings on Investment Advisers Act). The committees and the witnesses from
the investment industry recognized the importance of preserving a relationship of trust and
confidence between investment advisers and their clients. See House Report, supra note 2, at
28 (noting that drafters of Advisers Act respected personal relationship between investment
advisers and clients); Senate Report, supra note 2, at 21 (noting cooperation between SEC
and industry representatives in preparation of bill).
17. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 21 (recognizing need for legislation to protect
public investors and reputations of legitimate investment counselors); House Report, supra
note 2, at 28 (same).
18. See 1 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERs 23 (1978) (describing
original Investment Advisers Act as mere census of nation's investment advisers); Financial
Columnists as Investment Advisers: After Lowe and Carpenter,74 CALIF. L. REV. 2061, 2075
(1986) [hereinafter Financial Columnists] (suggesting Investment Advisers Act is weakest of
federal securities acts).
19. See T. FRANKEL, supra note 18, at 23 (describing steps Congress has taken to remedy
weaknesses in Investment Advisers Act). Since 1940, Congress has amended the Advisers Act
to require investment advisers to keep full records, to provide for inspectibn of advisers'
records by the SEC, and to regulate advisers that maintain custody of clients' funds. Id.
Congress has also added a standard for fraud and an explicit statement that the Advisers Act
prohibits fraud by unregistered advisers Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). Section 206 of the Advisers Act generally prohibits any
form of fraud or self-dealing by investment advisers. Id. Congress amended section 206 in
1960 to include all investment advisers, even if the Advisers Act does not require them to
register. S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CONG. CODE &
ADMIN. NEws 3052, 3505-06. Before Congress amended section 206 of the Advisers Act in
1960, section 206 expressly applied only to advisers that registered under section 203 of the
Advisers Act. Id.
21. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing implied
private right of action under section 206 of Advisers Act), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978) (same), vacated and
remanded, 444 U.S. 959 (1979); Comment, supra note 11, at 67-71 (discussing cases in which
second and fifth circuits have implied cause of 'action for damages under section 206 of
Advisors Act).
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United States Supreme Court, however, has held that section 206 of the
Advisers Act creates no private cause of action for damages. 22 According
to the Supreme Court, the only private remedies available under the Advisers
Act are rescission, injunction, and restitution in conjunction with contracts
void under section 215.2 3 By denying private citizens the right to sue
investment advisers who have violated the Advisers Act and caused injury,
the Supreme Court has placed responsibility for assuring compliance with
the Advisers Act almost entirely on the SEC.2
22. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). In Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis the United States Supreme Court considered whether
a shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of Mortgage Trust of America (Trust), a
real estate investment trust, and a class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders could
recover damages for violations of § 206 of the Advisers Act. Id. at 13. The plaintiff alleged
that several trustees of the Trust, the Trust's investment adviser, and two corporations affiliated
with the Trust had committed multiple acts of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty to the
Trust in violation of the Advisers Act. Id. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, recision of
the investment advisers contract between the Trust and the investment adviser, restitution of
fees and other considerations that the Trust paid to the defendants, an accounting of illegal
profits, and an award of damages. Id. at 14. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held that the Investment Advisers Act confers no private right of action
and, therefore, dismissed the complaint. Id. The plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp.,
575 F.2d 237, 237 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Congress' purpose
in enacting the Advisers Act required courts to imply a private right of action for injunctive
relief and damages. Id. at 239.
The defendants appealed the Ninth Circuit's ruling to the United States Supreme Court.
Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 14. On appeal the plaintiffs argued that since Congress intended
the Advisers Act to protect the clients of investment advisers, the Supreme Court should imply
a private right of action for their benefit. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court conceded that
Congress intended for section 206 of the Advisers Act to protect clients of investment advisers
from fraudulent activities but, nevertheless, held that section 206 implies no private right of
action for damages. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court noted that section 206 proscribes fraudulent
conduct by investment asdvisers but creates no special civil liabilities. Id. at 19. The Supreme
Court reasoned that since Congress expressly authorized private suits for damages in particular
circumstances in other securities acts, Congress expressly would have created a private suit for
damages in section 206 of the Advisers Act if Congress had wanted investors to be able to
sue for damages. Id. at 21. The Supreme Court held that only section 215 of the Advisers
Act, which voids contracts that violate the Advisers Act, implies a limited private cause of
action for recision of the illegal contract or an injunction prohibiting further performance
under the illegal contract and restitution of consideration that the client paid to the adviser.
Id. at 19.
23. See Transamerica,444 U.S. at 19 (discussing limited private causes of action available
under Investment Advisers Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1982) (declaring certain contracts void
under Advisers Act). Section 215(b) of the Advisers Act declares that any contract that the
parties entered, performed, or will perform in violation of the Advisers Act is void as between
the parties and third parties with actual knowledge of the facts. Id.
24. See Comment, supra note 11, at 72-74 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis of
sections 206 and 215 of Advisers Act). Section 209 of the Advisers Act authorizes the SEC to
bring civil actions in the federal courts to enforce compliance with the Advisers Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-9(e) (1982). Section 203 authorizes the SEC to impose various administrative sanctions
on persons who violate any provision of the Advisers Act or various other securities acts. 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1982); see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing powers of
SEC to enforce provisions of Advisers Act).

1144

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1139

To help prevent investment advisers from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices, section 203(a) of the Advisers Act currently requires any investment adviser who uses the mails or any other
means of interstate commerce to register with the SEC. 25 Additionally, the
Advisers Act requires registered investment advisers to keep records of
transactions and communications and to submit any reports that the SEC
prescribes. 26 The SEC periodically may inspect an investment adviser's
records to ensure that the adviser is complying with the Act. 27 Moreover,
the Advisers Act delegates broad authority to *the SEC to enforce the Act's
provisions by seeking injunctive relief and criminal penalties. 28 The SEC
also may hold hearings and censure, restrict, suspend, or revoke the registration of an investment adviser who has committed certain egregious
offenses. 29

25. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982).
26. Id. § 80b-4; Rules and Regulations, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. §
275.204-1 to -2 (1987). The SEC requires new investment advisers to register with the SEC by
filing Form ADV. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-1(a)(1). Every investment adviser annually must file
Form ADV-S within 90 days of the end of the adviser's fiscal year. Id. at 275.204-1(c). An
investment adviser that wishes to withdraw its registration must file with the SEC Form ADVW. Id. at § 275.203-2(a). The SEC prescribes several forms that non-resident investment
advisers must file to appoint an agent for service of process, pleadings, and other papers. Id.
at §§ 275.0-2, 279.4-279.7. See id. § 275.0-2(d)(3) (defining term "non-resident investment
adviser" as investment adviser that resides, maintains a principal place of business, or
incorporates in any place not subject to jurisdiction of United States).
The SEC requires all investment advisers except the classes that section 203(b) of the
Advisers Act exempts to maintain current and accurate books and records. Id. § 275.204-2.
According to the SEC, all investment advisers must maintain accounting and financial statements as well as all checks, bank statements, and bills or statement that relate to the adviser's
business. Id. at -2(a)(1), (2), (4)-(6). The SEC also requires investment advisers to keep records
of all orders to purchase and sell securities and originals of all written communications with
clients containing investment advice. Id. at -(2)(a)(3), (7). Finally, the SEC requires investment
advisers to keep records reflecting discretionary authority over clients' funds or businesses and
certain personal interests that the adviser may have in securities. Id. at (2)(a)(8)-(12).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1982). The Advisers Act provides that all records of investment
advisers are subject to reasonable examinations by representatives of the SEC as the SEC
deems necessary to protect investors. Id.
28. Id. § 80b-9(e) (action for injunction); id. § 80b-17 (criminal penalties). Section 209(e)
of the Advisers Act gives the SEC discretionary authority to bring an action in the proper
United States Court to enjoin acts or practices that violate the Advisers Act and to enforce
compliance with the Advisers Act. Id. § 80b-9(e). Section 209(e) also gives the SEC discretionary
authority to transmit evidence concerning violations of the Advisers Act to the United States
Attorney General who, in his discretion, may begin criminal proceedings. Id. Section 217 of
the Advisers Act provides that any person who willfully violates any provision of the Advisers
Act or any rule that the SEC has adopted pursuant to authority under the Advisers Act shall,
upon conviction, receive a prison sentence of not more than five years, a fine of not more
than $10,000, or both. Id. § 80b-17.
29. Id. § 80b-3(e). Before the SEC may discipline an investment adviser under section
203(e) of the Advisers Act, the SEC must give the investment adviser notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. Id. Section 203(e) allows the SEC to discipline an investment advisor who
willfully made or caused another person to make false or misleading statements to the SEC
in any application, report, or proceeding. Id. § 203(e)(1). The SEC also may take action

19881

INVESTMENT ADVISERS A CT

1145

Despite the Advisers Act's requirement that investment advisers who
use the mails or interstate commerce must register, section 202(a)(1 1) excludes six classes of persons who provide investment advice to the public
from the definition of an investment adviser.3 Additionally, section 203(b)
of the Advisers Act excludes three classes of investment advisers from the
Act's registration requirements. 3' Both the exclusions from the definition of
an investment adviser and the exclusions from the Act's registration requirements considerably limit the scope of the Advisers Act. 32 Although Congress
restricted the private causes of action that plaintiffs may pursue under the
Advisers Act and the classes of persons to which the Advisers Act applies,
the Advisers Act, nevertheless, affects a large class of persons in the
securities market. 33 The SEC has interpreted the Advisers Act's definition
of an investment adviser to reach beyond those persons wh6se sole business
is providing advice on investment in securities. 34 The SEC has classified
persons who regularly provide nearly any type of financial planning services
for compensation as investment advisers. 35 In addition to including a large
class of persons within the definition of the term "investment adviser," the
Advisers Act further expands the group of persons regulated under the
Advisers Act by broadly defining the term "security" to include a wide
range of profit-sharing investment opportunities in addition to stocks and

against an investment adviser who willfully has violated a federal securities law or has been
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor related to the securities market. Id. § 203(e)(2)-(3). The
Advisers Act also allows the SEC to discipline an investment adviser that a court of competent
jurisdiction has enjoined from engaging in any occupation or activity relating to the sale of
securities. Id. § 203(e)(3).
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing six classes of persons that Advisers
Act excludes from definition of investment adviser).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1)-(3) (1982). Section 203(b) of the Advisers Act excludes three
classes of persons that qualify as investment advisers under the Advisers Act from the Act's
registration requirements. Id. An investment adviser whose clients all reside within the state
in which the adviser maintains his or its principal office and that offers no advice on securities
listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange need not
register under the Advisers Act. Id. § 80b-3(b)(1). The Advisers Act also excludes any investment
adviser who exclusively counsels insurance companies. Id. § 80b-3(b)(2). Any investment adviser
who, during the preceding 12 months, has had fewer than 15 clients and who neither holds
himself out as an investment adviser nor serves as an investment adviser to an investment
company registered under the Investment Companies Act of 1940 need not register under the
Advisers Act. Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).
32. See Financial Columnists, supra note 18, at 2081 (noting that Advisers Act applies
to limited class of persons).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982) (defining investment adviser and listing exceptions
to definition); supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing limited private causes of
action under Advisers Act); see also Financial Columnists, supra note 18, at 2081 (noting
Investment Advisers Act applies to limited class of persons).
34. See Estate Planners, supra note 6, at 41-44 (discussing variety of occupations that
fall under Advisers Act). In Estate Planners the author discusses the circumstances in which
financial planners, personal managers, attorneys, accountants and professional trustees must
register under the Advisers Act. Id.
35. See id. at 40 (noting SEC's broad interpretation of Advisers Act's definition of
investment advisor).
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bonds. 16 The SEC's broad interpretation of the scope of the Advisers Act
has generated confusion in the financial community.37 In Release 1092 the

SEC attempts to outline the inquiries that financial planners should make
to determine whether they qualify as investment advisers and, therefore,
8
must register under the Advisers Act
In Release 1092 the SEC states that a financial planner typically analyzes
a client's financial circumstances and objectives and prepares a program to
manage the client's resources. 39 According to the SEC a financial planner
usually reviews a client's assets and liabilities, including insurance, savings,
investments, and employee and retirement benefits, and makes recommen40
dations on how the client should allocate resources and meet liabilities.
The SEC concludes, therefore, that financial planners provide primarily
advisory services. 4' The SEC observes in Release 1092, however, that some

financial planners also make specific recommendations to help clients im42
plement the general recommendations in the client's financial program.

According to the SEC, financial planners may charge an overall fee or an
hourly rate for their services. 43 The SEC observes, also, that some financial
planners rely wholly or partially on commissions from the sale of investment
products to their clients. 44
The SEC states in Release 1092 that in addition to financial planners,
pension consultants and sports and entertainment representatives provide

financial services that may subject them to the registration requirements of
the Advisers Act. 4S According to the SEC pension consultants typically

36. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1982). Under the Advisers Act the term "security" includes
notes, stocks, treasury stocks, bonds, debentures, evidences of indebtedness, certificates of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, and an extensive list of other interests
in common enterprises. Id.
37. See Information Technology, supra note 7, at 793 (noting lack of judicial decisions
that construe definition of investment adviser). Because the SEC interprets the Advisers Act's
definition of an investment adviser broadly and courts rarely have interpreted the definition,
financial planners frequently ask the SEC staff to determine whether their business practice
fits the Advisers Act's definition. Id.; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing
SEC no-action letters).
38. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,555 (stating that purpose of Release is to
provide uniform interpretations of federal and state adviser laws).
39. See id. (describing typical activities of financial planners); infra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text (same); supra note 3 and accompanying text (distinguishing financial planner
from investment adviser).
40. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,555.

41. Id. In Release 1092 the SEC suggests, for example, that a financial planner may
provide advisory services by recommending that a client purchase additional insurance or revise
existing coverage, open an individual retirement account, increase or decrease funds in savings
accounts, or invest in the securities market. Id.
42. Id. The SEC observes in Release 1092 that some investment advisers actually sell
insurance, securities or other investments to their clients. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. See id. at 27,555-56 (discussing financial planning services that pension consultants
and sports and entertainment representatives typically provide); infra notes 46-50 and accom-
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analyze the needs of a pension plan and advise the plan's fiduciaries on
available investment opportunities and the most advantageous allocation of

the plan's assets. 46 The SEC notes that pension consultants also may assist
a plan's fiduciaries in developing broad objectives and policies.47 Release

1092 explains that sports and entertainment representative provide financial
advisory services to professional athletes and entertainers. 4 According to
the SEC representatives typically negotiate employment and promotional

contracts and assist athletes and entertainers with budgeting, investing, and
tax planning. 49 The SEC notes, further, that some representatives assume a
direct role in collecting a client's income, paying the client's bills, and
making investments for the client.50
While the registration requirements of the Advisers Act apply to nearly
all financial planners, pension consultants, and sports and entertainment

representatives, the SEC recognizes in Release 1092 that the Advisers Act
applies to persons who provide investment advice in other capacities. The
SEC's primary purpose in Release 1092 is to describe how the SEC staff
determines whether a person qualifies as an investment adviser.5 2 In Release
1092 the SEC sets forth a three-pronged test to determine whether a person

acts as an investment adviser.53 The first prong of 'the SEC's test requires
that the person provides advice or issues reports or analyses regarding
securities.5 4 The second prong limits the scope of the Advisers Act to persons

who are in the business of providing financial advice. 5 The third prong of

panying text (describing activities of pension consultants and sports and entertainment representatives).
46. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,555-56 (describing typical duties of pension
consultants).
47. Id. In Rel. No. 1092 the SEC notes that in addition to recommending particular
investments, pension consultants may assist plan fiduciaries in selecting persons to manage the
assets of the plan. Id.
48. See id. at 27,556 (describing typical duties of sports and entertainment representatives).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. (recognizing that not all investment advisers function precisely as financial
planners, pension consultants, or sports and entertainment representatives).
52. See id. at 27,556-556C (outlining procedure for determining whether person functions
as investment adviser); see infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's method
for determining whether person functions as investment adviser).
53. See id. at 27,556-556B (describing three criteria relevant to analysis of whether person
functions as investment adviser). The SEC derived its discussion in Release 1092 of the
securities advice and compensation elements of the Advisers Act's definition of an investment
adviser almost solely from an earlier interpretive release. Id. The SEC's analysis of the business
element of the definition of an investment adviser constitutes the primary departure from the
language of the release that preceded Rel. No. 1092. See id. at 27,555 (noting SEC staff's
attempt to clarify business element of definition of investment adviser).
54. Id. at 27,556; see infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (discussing first prong of
SEC's test to determine whether person functions as investment adviser).
55. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A; see infra notes 85-130 and accompanying
text (discussing second prong of SEC's text to determine whether person functions as investment
adviser).
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the SEC's test requires that the person provides advice for compensation.5 6

A person who satisfies all three requirements qualifies as an investment
adviser and must register with the
SEC unless the person fits within one of
7
5

the Advisers Act's exemptions.
To aid practitioners in determining when clients must register under the
Advisers Act, the SEC in Release 1092 individually considers each prong of

58
the test to determine whether a person functions as an investment adviser.

According to Release 1092 a person who advises clients or issues reports

concerning specific securities clearly satisfies the first prong of the SEC
test. 9 The SEC has concluded, however, that a person who provides advice
or reports that do not pertain to specific securities also may provide the
advice or analysis concerning securities necessary to bring a person under
the Advisers Act. 60 The SEC has stated that an investment adviser who
gives a client advice that is more involved than a discussion in general terms

of the advantages and disadvantages of investing in securities provides
advice concerning securities within the meaning of the Advisers Act. 61 Even
advice on the desirability of investing in securities instead of other investments qualifies as advice concerning securities under the Advisers Act. 62 In

56. Rel. No. 1092, supranote 8, at 27,556A-556B; see infra notes 73-84 and accompanying

text (describing third prong of SEC's test to determine whether person functions as investment
advisor).
57. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556C (discussing persons exempt from

registration under Advisors Act); supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing persons
that qualify under Advisers Act as investment advisers but need not register with SEC).
58. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556-556B (explaining SEC's interpretation of
three prongs of test to determine whether person qualifies as investment adviser under Advisers
Act).
59. See id. at 27,556 (recognizing applicability of Advisers Act to persons that provide
specific securities advice).
60. See id. (providing examples of securities advice within meaning of Advisers Act); T.
FRANKEL, supra note 18, at 156-62 (discussing investment advice within meaning of Advisers
Act); infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (describing persons that do not provide advice
on specific securities yet qualify as investment advisers under Advisers Act).
61. See Linda Arnold, SEC No-Action Letter, Aug. 23, 1984 (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) [hereinafter Linda Arnold] (describing investment advice that satisfies first prong
of SEC test to determine whether person is investment advisor); see also Southmark Financial
Services, SEC No-Action Letter, August 23, 1984 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same).
62. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556; Sinclair-deMarinis, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, May 1, 1981 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter Sinclair-deMarinis];
Thomas Beard, SEC No-Action Letter, May 8, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). In
Sinclair-deMarinis an attorney asked the SEC whether Sinclair-deMarinis, a New York corporation dealing in numismatics, needed to register under the Advisers Act. Sinclair-deMarinis,
supra. The attorney defined numismatics as coins, currency, tokens, medals, and stamps. Id.
The attorney explained that Sinclair bought and sold numismatics strictly on a cash basis and
contemplated issuing a market letter to advise clients and prospective clients on the value of
various numismatics. Id. The SEC responded, first, that numismatics do not qualify as securities
under section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act. Id. The SEC advised, therefore, that a business
that provides advice solely on numismatics need not register under the Advisers Act. Id. The
SEC indicated, however, that Sinclair might qualify as an investment adviser if Sinclair
provided advice concerning the advisability of investing in numismatics relative to securities.
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a no-action letter to Linda Arnold, for example, the SEC considered whether

Ms. Arnold, a licensed dealer in life and health insurance and annuities,
needed to register as an investment adviser.6 3 Ms. Arnold was considering

whether to begin providing limited financial planning services to her clients.

4

Ms. Arnold emphasized that she would restrict her recommendations to
categories of investments and recommend no specific investments.6 5 Although
Ms. Arnold stressed that she would neither hold herself out to the public

as an investment adviser, provide analysis or reports on securities, nor have
custody of clients' funds, the SEC responded that Ms. Arnold might qualify

as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act.6 6 The SEC warned that if
Ms. Arnold offered clients more than a general discussion of the advisability
of investing in securities in the context of a conference concerning a client's
financial plan, Ms. Arnold's activities might qualify her as an investment
adviser.67 Furthermore, the SEC cautioned that advice concerning specific
categories of investments such as bonds, mutual funds, and technology
stocks also could qualify as investment advice under the Advisers Act.68
Although the SEC broadly defines investment advice when determining

whether advice that financial planners personally render to clients satisfies
the first prong of the three-pronged investment adviser test, the SEC applies
the first prong of the test less rigorously to published advice and analysis

on securities. 69 The United States Supreme Court has restricted the SEC's
ability to regulate persons who publish general securities advice by holding

that the Advisers Act excludes publishers of impersonal, analytical reports
concerning securities from the definition of an investment adviser.7 0 The

Id. Under the SEC's interpretation, therefore, Sinclair could avoid the Advisers Act's registration requirements if Sinclair restricted its investment advice to the market for numismatics.
Id.
63. Linda Arnold, supra note 61. In Linda Arnold Arnold stated that in addition to
selling insurance, she also prepared tax returns and provided accounting services on a fee
basis. Id.
64. Id. Specifically, Arnold contemplated preparing financial statements such as balance
sheets and cash flow statements, compiling data on the effects of inflation and taxes on her
clients' objectives, and recommending a general investment strategy suitable for her clients'
needs. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id; infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's reasons for determining
that Advisers Act may require Arnold to register as investment adviser).
67. Linda Arnold, supra note 61.
68. Id.
69. See FinancialColumnists, supra note 18, at 2079 (observing that financial columnists
rendering impersonal advice are not subject to Advisers Act's registration requirements); infra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Supreme Court ruling on applicability
of Advisers Act to financial columnists).
70. See Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 210 & n.58 (1963) (holding that
publishers of general, impersonal expressions of opinion concerning securities need not register
under Advisers Act). In Lowe the United States Supreme Court considered whether to enjoin
the publishers of a newspaper that contained investment advice because the publishers had not
registered under the Advisers Act. Id. at 183. Christopher Lowe served as president and
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Supreme Court recognized that Congress desired to regulate only those

investment advisers who provide personalized investment advice and to
avoid unconstitutional interference with publishers of general securities
advice. 71 With the single exception of certain publications, therefore, the
SEC regards all but the most general discussions as advice or analysis
72
concerning securities under the Advisers Act.
principal shareholder of Lowe Management Corporation, a registered investment adviser from
1974 to 1981. Id. Because a New York court convicted Lowe of multiple fraudulent acts and
theft, the SEC revoked Lowe Management Corporation's registration as an investment adviser
in 1981 and ordered Lowe not to associate with any investment adviser. Id. Lowe, however,
in conjunction with Lowe Management and two other corporations, continued to publish two
investment newsletters. Id. The SEC, therefore, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that Lowe and the other corporations
were violating the Advisers Act and that Lowe was violating the SEC order with respect to
Lowe and Lowe Management Corporation. S.E.C. v. Lowe, 556 F.Supp 1359, 1362 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The SEC asked the court to enjoin Lowe from publishing further investment newsletters
and to force Lowe to comply with the SEC order revoking Lowe's registration as an investment
adviser. Id. The district court enjoined Lowe and the defendant corporations from engaging
in all types of investment advisory activity except for publishing their newsletters. Id. at 1371.
The district court determined that although the SEC could regulate personal investment advice
under the Advisers Act, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited the
court from enjoining Lowe from publishing impersonal investment newsletters. Id. The district
court, therefore, held that if Lowe complied with the Advisers Act's disclosure and reporting
requirements, the SEC must allow Lowe to register for the limited purpose of publishing an
impersonal newsletter. Id.
The SEC appealed the district court's holding to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. S.E.C. v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 892 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit
reversed the district court's injunction, holding that the SEC did not violate Lowe's First
Amendment rights when the SEC attempted to prohibit Lowe from publishing an investment
newsletter. Id. at 898-900. According to the Second Circuit, government does not violate the
First Amendment when it regulates advertising that is harmful to the public. Id. at 899-900.
In view of Lowe's history of fraudulent activity, the Second Circuit determined that Lowe's
newsletter presented a danger of further public deception. Id. at 901. Lowe appealed the
Second Circuit ruling to the United States Supreme Court. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181
(1985).
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Id. at 211.
Although the Supreme Court concluded that Congress sought to avoid unconstitutional
regulation of the press when Congress drafted the Advisers Act, the Court decided Lowe's
case solely on statutory grounds. Id. at 204, 207-11. The Supreme Court stated that Congress
intended for the Advisers Act to regulate persons that tailor investment advice to the needs
of individual clients. Id. at 208. Since Lowe's investment newsletters provided only advice on
the securities market in general, the Supreme Court concluded that Lowe fit within the
exception to the definition of an investment adviser for publishers of newspapers of general
circulation. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1)(D) (1982). The Supreme Court held, therefore, that
neither Lowe's unregistered status nor the SEC order prohibiting Lowe from associating with
investment advisers justified a court order barring Lowe from publishing impersonal investment
newsletters. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211.
71. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 207-08 (recognizing Congressional intent to regulate only
those investment advisers that directly affect individual investment decisions and to avoid
unconstitutional interference with persons that provide general rather than personalized investment advice).
72. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556-556A (describing what constitutes securities
advice within meaning of Advisors Act).
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The third prong of the SEC test to determine whether a person functions
as an investment adviser restricts adviser status to those persons who give
investment advice for compensation.73 The SEC explains in Release 1092
that an investment adviser's compensation may take the form of an advisory
fee, commissions, or any combination of the two. 74 The SEC states, further,
that an investment adviser need not charge a separate fee for advisory
services to satisfy the compensation element of the test.7 5 According to the
SEC, therefore, a financial planner receives compensation within the meaning of the Advisers Act even if the client pays the adviser a single fee for
a package of financial services.7 6 Insurance brokers, for example, that receive
a single fee fdr analyzing clients' insurance needs and for providing general
investment advice may satisfy the third prong of the SEC's test. 7
The SEC notes in Release 1092, additionally, that a person may receive
compensation under the Advisers Act even if the client does not directly
pay the adviser. 7 Accordingly, if a person renders financial services, including investment advice, and receives economic benefit solely from commissions on investments that the client purchases, the SEC would find that
the person receives compensation under the Advisers Act and satisfies the
third prong of the three-pronged investment adviser test.7 9 In Warren H.
Livingston, for example, Mr. Livingston informed the SEC that he planned
to start a business in which he would distribute annual and quarterly reports
of public companies to organizations such as investment clubs and libraries.8 0

73. Id. at 27,556A-556B; see infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (discussing third
prong of SEC test to determine whether person functions as investment advisor).
74. Rel. No. 1092 supra note 8, at 27,556A.
75. Id. at 27,556A-556B.
76. Id; FINESCO, SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 11, 1979 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) [hereinafter FINESCO]. In FINESCO a partnership of insurance brokers requested an
interpretative position from the SEC on whether the partnership needed to register as an
investment advisor. FINESCO, supra. The partners stated that although they acted primarily
as insurance brokers, they also provided financial planning, tax counseling, and general
investment advisory services. Id. FINESCO occasionally charged fees for counseling services
but usually provided counseling services at no cost to insurance clients. Id.
The SEC responded that FINESCO should register as an investment advisor. Id. The SEC
noted that a person providing financial advice received compensation within the meaning of
the Advisers Act if the person charged a single fee for a package of financial services that
included investment advice. Id. Because FINESCO occasionally charged a fee for advisory
services, the SEC concluded that FINESCO satisfied the third prong of the test to determine
whether a person functions as an investment advisor Id.
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letter in which SEC
applied third prong of test for investment advisor to insurance brokers that provided limited
investment advice).
78. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556B.
79. Id.; cf. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556B n.10 (noting that Advisors Act

exempts brokers and dealers that perform investment advisory services that are incidental to
conduct of broker or dealer business and that receive no special compensation for investment
advice); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (1982).
80. Warren H. Livingston, SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 8, 1980 (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) [hereinafter Warren H. Livingston].
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Mr. Livingston explained that he would charge the companies a fee for
distributing the reports but would not charge any fee to the recipients of
the reports. 8' Mr. Livingston asked the SEC whether his prospective business
venture would qualify him as an investment adviser under the Advisers
Act. 82 In applying the third prong of the test to determine whether Mr.
Livingston's plan would render him an investment adviser, the SEC stated
that an investment adviser need not receive compensation from the recipients
of the advice to qualify as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act. 83
The SEC concluded, therefore, that if Livingston received compensation
from the issuers of the reports, Livingston would satisfy the third prong of
84
the SEC test.
Although the SEC in Release 1092 relies on an earlier interpretive release
to discuss the securities advice and compensation elements of the threepronged investment adviser test, the SEC attempts in Release 1092 to clarify
the second prong of the test. 5 The second prong of the SEC's test requires
8 6
that the person engage in the business of providing advice on securities.
The SEC explains in Release 1092 that if a person gives investment advice
with some regularity, the giving of investment advice need not constitute
all or any particular part of a person's business for the person to be in the
business of providing advice on securities under the Advisers Act.8 7 The
SEC lists three criteria in Release 1092 to determine whether a person is in
the business of providing securities advice.88 The SEC deems a person to
be in the business of providing securities advice if the person holds himself
out as an investment adviser, receives separate compensation for securities
advice, or regularly provides specific securities advice. 89 According to the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. In Warren H. Livingston the SEC responded that the manner in which Livingston
selected the reports that he distributed, the nature of the audience to whom Livingston delivered
the reports, and whether Livingston edited the reports or added analysis or recommendations
would determine whether Livingston qualified as an investment advisor. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556-556B (discussing securities advice and
compensation elements of test to determine whether person functions as investment advisor);
id. at 27,555 (proposing to clarify in Release 1092 second prong of test to determine whether
person functions as investment advisor); infra notes 86-132 and accompanying text (discussing
second prong of test to determine whether person functions as investment adviser); see also
Applicability of the Investment Advisors Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and
Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial
Services, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 770 (August 13, 1981) [hereinafter Rel.
No. 770] (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (prior SEC release discussing scope of Investment
Advisers Act that SEC sought to clarify and update in Release 1092).
86. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A (discussing acts that constitute business
of providing advice on securities).
87. Id.
88. Id; infra note 89 and accompanying text (listing SEC criteria to determine whether
person is in business of providing securities advice).
89. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A (listing three criteria that satisfy business
standard under Advisers Act).
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SEC, therefore, a person who satisfies one or more of the three criteria is

in the business of providing advice on securities. 90 To clarify the second
prong of the investment adviser test, the SEC in Release 1092 individually

considers each criteria of the business test. 9'
When determining whether a person is in the business of giving investment advice, the SEC considers, first, whether the person holds himself out

as an investment adviser or as one who provides investment advice. 92 Before
issuing Release 1092 the SEC addressed the question of whether a person
holds himself out as an investment adviser in the context of the exemption
to the Advisers Act's registration requirements in section 203(b)(3). 93 The
SEC also considered whether a person holds himself out as an investment
adviser in the context of the section 202(a)(1 1)(B) exception to the definition
of an investment adviser for persons whose advisory services are solely

incidental to certain other professions. 94 According to the SEC, a person

90. Id.
91. See id. (describing criteria that satisfy business test); infra notes 133-138 and accompanying test (discussing SEC's attempt in Release 1092 to clarify business test under Advisers
Act).
92. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A.
93. See Peter H. Jacobs, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 7, 1979 (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
Noact file) [hereinafter Peter H. Jacobs] (considering whether lawyer held self out as investment
adviser and, therefore, failed to qualify for exemption to registration requirements in section
203(b) of Advisers Act). In Peter H. Jacobs, Jacobs, a lawyer who managed his firm's pension
plan, asked the SEC whether he qualified for an exemption from the Advisers Act's registration
requirements. Id. Jacobs explained that he recently had received an offer from the brokerage
house with which his firm held an account to manage several other corporate funds and
individual accounts. Id. Jacobs wanted to know whether he needed to register as an investment
adviser if he decided to accept the offer to manage additional funds. Id.
The SEC suggested that unless Jacobs qualified for the exception to the definition of an
investment adviser for a lawyer whose performance of investment advisory services is solely
incidental to another profession, Jacobs would have to register as an investment adviser. Id.;
see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982) (exception to definition of investment adviser). The SEC
noted, however, that section 203(b) of the Advisers Act exempts from the Advisers Act's
registration requirements any investment adviser that, during the previous twelve months, has
had fewer than fifteen clients and that neither acts as investment adviser to an investment
company nor publicly holds himself out as an investment adviser. Peter H. Jacobs, supra.
The SEC noted, further, that a person may hold himself out as an investment adviser by
publicly offering services as an investment adviser or an investment manager. Id. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(b) (1982) (exempting from Investment Advisors Act's registration requirements any
investment advisor that, during previous twelve months, has had fewer than fifteen clients and
that has not held himself out to public as investment advisor); supra note 22 and accompanying
text (describing classes of investment advisers that need not register with SEC).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(lI)(B) (1982) (exempting lawyers, accountants, engineers
and teachers whose performance of advisory services is solely incidental to main profession
from definition of investment advisor); Hauk, Soule & Fasani, P.C., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,311, at 79,943 (May 2, 1986)
[hereinafter Hauk] (accountant that holds self out to public as investment advisor may not
take advantage of exception to definition of investment advisor in section 202(a)(1I)(B) of
Advisers Act); David R. Markley, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 6, 1985 (LEXIS, Fedsec library,
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need not use the words "investnent adviser" to hold himself out as an
investment adviser under the Advisers Act. 95 The SEC considers a person
who publicly offers financial planning or investment planning services to
be holding himself out as an investment adviser. 96 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has held that a person who
offered services as an employment and business adviser to a professional
football player did not hold himself out as an investment adviser. 97 Ac-

Noact file) (same).
In Hauk a certified public accounting firm requested an SEC determination of whether
the firm functioned as an investment advisor. Hauk, supra. One of the services that Hauk
offered to its clients was a financial planning service. Id. Several members of Hauk's staff
engaged in a comprehensive analysis of a client's financial situation and prepared a report
projecting a client's future cash, insurance, and investment needs and recommending tax and
estate planning strategies. Id. Hauk emphasized that it identified itself to the public as an
accounting firm. Id. Although Hauk admitted that it referred to the report that it prepared
as a financial plan, Hauk contended that it did not hold itself out to the public as an
investment advisor. Id.
The SEC responded that whether an accountant or accounting firm holds itself out to the
public as an investment advisor is relevant to whether the accountant or accounting firm
qualifies for the exception to the definition of an investment advisor for persons that provide
financial planning services that are solely incidental to the practice of accounting. Id.; 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B) (1982). The SEC suggested that an accountant who publicly offers
financial planning, pension consulting, or other financial advisory services holds himself as an
investment advisor. Hauk, supra. The SEC stated that on the basis of Hauk's representation,
Hauk's financial planning service seemed solely incidental to its accounting practice and,
therefore, exempt from the Advisers Act's registration requirements. Id.
95. See Peter H. Jacobs, supra note 93 (person who describes own services using such
terms as investment management or investment adviser holds self out as investment advisor).
96. See Alan P. Woodruff, SEC No-Action Letter, Aug. 27, 1987 (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (suggesting that person who publicly offers financial planning or investment
planning services holds self out as investment advisor); Hauk, Soule & Fasani, supra note 94,
at 76,943 (suggesting that person who offers financial planning, pension consulting, or other
financial advisory services holds self out as investment adviser).
97. See Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding personal manager
for professional football player did not hold self out as investment adviser). In Zinn, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether a personal manager
who furnished business advice to a professional football player violated the Advisers Act by
failing to register with the SEC as an investment adviser. Id. at 362. Leo Zinn, a business
manager for professional athletes, entered into a series of contracts with Lemar Parrish, a
professional football player for the Cincinnati Bengals. Id. at 361. The contracts required Zinn
to negotiate football contracts for Parrish and to furnish advice on business investments, tax
planning, and endorsement contracts. Id.
When Parrish refused to pay Zinn commissions for a contract that Zinn had negotiated,
Zinn sued to recover the commissions. Zinn v. Parrish, 461 F. Supp. 11, 12 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois declared the contract
unenforceable because Zinn had failed to register as a private employment agency under an
Illinois statute and entered summary judgment for Parrish. Id. Zinn appealed the summary
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Zinn v. Parrish, 582
F.2d 1282, 1282 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court to resolve certain questions of fact. Id. On remand, the district court entered a
verdict in Parrish's favor, holding that Zinn had failed to perform his own obligations under
the contract and that the contract was void because Zinn had failed to register as an investment

19881

INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT

1155

cording to the SEC, a person may hold himself out by word of mouth or
through stationery, business cards, or a listing in a telephone, building, or
business directory.9 8 Moreover, when a person allows a third party to
publicize that the person is willing to accept new clients, the person may
be holding himself out under the Advisers Act.9
The second criteria that the SEC considers to determine whether a
person is in the business of providing securities advice is whether the person
receives separate, definable compensation for giving advice on securities. 1°°

adviser under the Adviser's Act. See Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1981)
(discussing unreported district court opinion on remand). Zinn appealed the district court's
ruling to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 361.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that Zinn did not need
to register as an investment adviser. Id. at 364. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Zinn was
not in the business of providing investment advice within the meaning of the Advisers Act.
Id. On the specific issue of whether Zinn held himself out as an investment adviser, the
Seventh Circuit cited testimony indicating that Zinn advertised by word of mouth that he
would perform personal management services and that Zinn listed himself in the telephone
directory as a public relations consultant. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded, therefore, that
Zinn did not hold himself out to the public as an investment adviser. Id. Because Zinn neither
held himself out as an investment adviser nor regularly provided securities advice, the Seventh
Circuit held that Zinn was not in the business of providing investment advice and, therefore,
need not register as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act. Id. at 364.
98. See Oneco, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1985 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (suggesting mediums through which person may hold self out as investment adviser); Peter
H. Jacobs, supra note 93 (same).
99. Guardian Investment Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,361, at 77,146 (Sep. 18, 1986) [hereinafter Guardian].
In Guardian the attorney for American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. (ABIG) asked the SEC
to determine whether Guardian Investment Services, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of ABIG,
qualified for an exception to the registration requirements of the Advisers Act. Id. Guardian
intended to advise ABIG and several of ABIG's other subsidiaries concerning only obligations
on the governments of the United States and the state of Florida. Id. at 77,147. Guardian
also proposed to provide investment advise to various Florida residents through contacts of
ABIG. Id. Guardian insisted that it would advise neither non-Florida residents nor corporations
that incorporated outside of Florida. Id.
The SEC responded that Guardian might qualify for the section 203(b)(1) exemption to
the Advisers Act's registration requirements. Id. at 77,148. The SEC noted that Section
203(b)(1) provides an exemption to registration for advisers that only advise clients that reside
within the state in which the adviser maintains his principal place of business and that furnish
no advice on securities that appear on a national securities exchange. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 80b3(1) (1982). The SEC observed that Guardian would not qualify for the section 203(b)(3)
exemption to the Advisers Act's registration requirements because the facts indicated that
Guardian held itself out to the public as an investment adviser. Guardian, supra, at 77,148.
According to the SEC, a person holds himself out as an investment adviser if the person
allows others to publicize through word of mouth that the person desires to take on new
investment clients. Id. Because Guardian intended to offer advisory services to clients that
Guardian acquired through ABIG, the SEC concluded that Guardian would hold itself out as
an investment adviser. Id. at 77,149.
100. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A. The SEC release that preceded Release
1092 also mentioned compensation as a factor relevant to whether a person is in the business
of giving securities advice. See Rel. No. 770, supra note 85 (discussing separate compensation
as compondnt of business of providing securities advice.)
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The compensation element of the business standard focuses more on the
separate character of the compensation than the compensation element of
the definition of an investment adviser.' 0 l The SEC has stated, for example,
that a person's investment advisory business need not constitute all or any
2
particular portion of his entire business to come within the Advisers Act.l
According to the SEC, therefore, a person who earns only a small percentage
of his total revenues from investment advisory services may, nevertheless,
be in the business of providing investment advice under the Advisers Act.103
The SEC has stated, further, that even a nonprofit corporation may be in
the business of providing advice on securities if the corporation charges any
type of fee for its services and compensates its officers and employees for
those services." 4

101. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556B (distinguishing compensation that will
satisfy definition of investment advisor from separate compensation that person in business of
providing securities advice receives). Although most of the no-action letters in which the SEC
addresses compensation discuss compensation in terms of the definition of an investment
adviser, a few letters discuss separate compensation in terms of whether a person is in the
business of providing investment advice. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (discussing compensation element of definition of investment advisor); infra notes 102-104 and
accompanying text (discussing letters in which SEC has addressed separate compensation as
factor in determining whether person is in business of providing securities advice).
102. See Hauk, supra note 94, at 79,943 (fact that investment advice constitutes small
portion of person's business does not guarantee that person is not in business of providing
investment advice).
103. Id.
104. See Atlanta Economic Development Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan 30, 1987
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter Atlanta] (noting that SEC considers some
nonprofit corporations to be in business of providing investment advice); Chimorel Services,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, June 7, 1982 (LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File) (same). In
Atlanta, counsel for the Atlanta Economic Development Corporation (AEDC) requested the
SEC to determine whether ADEC needed to register as an investment adviser. Atlanta, supra.
AEDC stated that it exists for the purpose of promoting economic development in the city of
Atlanta. Id. AEDC maintained a computer file of investment opportunities in Atlanta. Id.
AEDC solicited potential investors and requested the investors to complete a questionnaire
describing the type of investments that the investors would like to make. Id. AEDC utilized
a computer matching system to provide potential investors with a list of opportunities in
Atlanta that matched the investor's profile. Id. AEDC received an initial application fee and
a periodic fee from each entrepreneur and potential investor. Id. The amount of~a potential
investor's fee depended upon the range of opportunities in which the investor expressed an
interest. Id. Employees of AEDC receive regular salaries but no special compensation related
to the success of AEDC. Id.
In considering whether AEDC had to register under the Advisers Act, the SEC suggested
that AEDC might qualify for an exemption to the requirements of the Advisers Act because
AEDC exists as an agency of the city of Atlanta. Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(b) (1982) (exempting
United States, states, political subdivisions of states, and agencies, instrumentalities and
authorities thereof from provisions of Advisers Act). The SEC noted, however, that the
Advisers Act may apply to a nonprofit corporation if the corporation charges a fee for the
advisory services that it provides and if the corporation compensates its officers and employees.
Atlanta, supra. Since AEDC charges a periodic fee for advisory services and pays salaries to
employees, the SEC stated that the fact that AEDC distributed no net profits to individuals
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Theoretically, a person could receive compensation that would bring
him within the definition of an investment adviser but not qualify as separate
compensation for the purpose of determining whether the person is in the
business of providing securities advice. 05 Before Release 1092, neither the
SEC nor the courts clearly distinguished the two contexts in which compensation appears.' °6 In Release 1092, however, the SEC emphasizes the separate
character of compensation that places a person in the business of giving
securities advice."07 Because separate compensation is one way to satisfy the
second prong of the investment adviser test, persons questioning whether
to register under the Advisers Act must consider the separate character of
compensation that satisfies the business test. 08 The SEC's analysis in Release
1092 of an investment adviser's compensation, therefore, encourages more
careful consideration of the two contexts in which compensation is relevant
under the Advisers Act.' °9
The third factor that the SEC considers in determining whether a person
is in the business of providing advice on securities is whether the person,
on more than rare, isolated occasions, provides specific investment advice." 0
In Release 1092 the SEC explains that specific investment advice includes
any oral or written recommendation concerning specific securities or specific
categories of securities and any recommendation by an investment adviser
that a client allocate specific percentages of his resources among various
categories of securities."' The SEC notes, however, that general advice on

did not necessarily exclude AEDC from the business of providing investment advice. Id.
The SEC distinguished Atlanta from an earlier inquiry in which the SEC issued a noaction position with respect to a nonprofit corporation that provided an investment matching
service similar to the service that AEDC provides. See Venture Capital Network, SEC NoAction Letter, May 7, 1984 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) [hereinafter Venture] (concluding that nonprofit corporation did not engage in business of providing investment advice).
In Venture, the SEC observed that Venture Capital Network charged only a fixed introductory
fee, regardless of the number of times that the investor utilized the service. Id. In Atlanta,
however, AEDC admitted that it would charge potential investors a fee that would vary
according to the range of services that the client utilized. Atlanta, supra. The SEC suggested
that AEDC's variable fee brought AEDC within the Advisers Act's registration requirements
as an entity that rendered investment advice as part of a regular business. Id.
105. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556B (distinguishing two contexts under
Investment Advisors Act in which receipt of compensation is relevant).
106. See Polera v. Altorfer, Potesta, Woolard & Co., 503 F. Supp. 116, 119 (1980)
(referring to special compensation as general requirement of definition of investment advisor);
Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,188, at 76,767 (Jan 6, 1986) (same).
107. See Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A (emphasizing that only compensation
that represents a distinguishable charge for securities advice places person in the business of
providing securities advice).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. In several no-action letters that preceded Release 1092, the SEC suggested that
a person that provided advice on the wisdom of investing in specific securities or specific
categories of securities was in the business of providing investment advice. See Jack N. Alpern
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how a client should allocate assets between securities and other types of
investments does not constitute specific investment advice."12 The SEC notes,
finally, that clever financial planners may attempt to structure their businesses to avoid the Advisers Act's registration requirements.1 1 3 The SEC
suggests, for example, that a financial planner deliberately may offer only
general advice as a financial planner but offer specific securities advice
under one of the professions exempt from the Advisers Act under sections
202(a)(1 1)(A)-(E)." 4 To prevent financial planners from circumventing the
Advisers Act's registration requirements, the SEC states in Release 1092
that the SEC will consider all of the financial services that a person offers
to determine whether the person gives specific investment advice." 5 Thus,
the SEC will consider a financial planner who offers specific securities
advice in another capacity to be in the business of providing securities
advice.116

The specific investment advice that places a person in the business of
providing investment advice is difficult to distinguish from the advice on
securities that satisfies the Advisers Act's definition of an investment adviser. 1 7 In Release 1092 the SEC attempts to differentiate specific investment
advice from more general advice on securities."' Unlike the general investment advice requirement under the three-pronged investment adviser test,
the SEC's standard of specific investment advice requires both specificity
and frequency." 9 The most common example of a person who gives infrequent advice under the SEC standard is a person whose investment advice
is solely incidental to one of the professions included under section

Co., L.P.A., SEC No-Action Letter, Apr. 23, 1986 (LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File)
[hereinafter Jack N. Alpern] (discussing advice that satisfies business element of investment
adviser test); Suzanne Clark-James, SEC No-Action Letter, Aug. 30, 1984 (LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File) [hereinafter Suzanne Clark-James] (same).
112. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A. The general advice that the SEC states
does not constitute specific investment advice must concern simply the types of ventures in
which a client should invest but not the wisdom of investing in any particular type of venture.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting that advice on the wisdom of investing in
particular types of ventures indicates person is in business of providing investment advice).
113. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A.

114. Id.; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing classes of persons exempt
from definition of investment adviser).
115. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A.

116. Id.
117. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (discussing investment advice as element
of definition of investment adviser). The SEC drew the precise language for the specific
investment advice standard from the general discussion in the release that preceded Release
1092 of whether a person is in the business of providing advice on securities. See Rel. No.
770, supra note 85 (discussing types of advice that person in business of providing investment
advice might offer).
118. Rel. No. 1092, supra note 8, at 27,556A.

119. See infra notes 120-132 and accompanying text (discussing specificity and frequency
as components of specific investment advice).
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202(a)(1 1)(B) of the Advisers Act.1 20 Although specificity of securities advice

is more difficult to analyze, the SEC stated in several no-action letters
before Release 1092 that the SEC would deem a person in the business of

providing securities advice if, other than on rare, isolated instances, the
person discussed or issued reports concerning specific securities or specific
categories of securities.' 2 For example, in Suzanne Clark-James Ms. James,
a certified public accountant, asked the SEC for advice on whether to
register under the Advisers Act.'12 Ms. James stated that she offered financial

planning and counseling and tax services to individual and small business
clients and, when her clients requested additional services, she contacted
other financial specialists on her clients' behalf.'2 Ms. James noted, additionally, that she intended to make financial planning a regular aspect of
her accounting practice in the future.'1 The SEC advised Ms. James that
if a person discusses with clients the advisability of investing in securities

only in the context of a general discussion of the client's financial plan,
the person would not be in the business of providing investment advice.'1

The SEC noted, however, that a person who advises a client to allocate his
giving
funds in bonds, mutual funds and technology stocks would be
26
sufficiently specific investment advice to satisfy the business test.'
Conversely, in Wallace E. Lin a computer software manufacturer who
sold programs to financial counselors and brokers who performed solely
organizational and arithmetical functions asked the SEC to determine whether

the manufacturer should register under the Advisers Act.' 27 Mr. Lin explained that the program would gather statistics on major stocks listed on

the New York and American Stock Exchanges and assist users in making

120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to definition of
investment adviser); see also Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that
isolated investment transactions incident to management contract with professional football
player did not constitute business of providing advice on securities); supra note 97 and
accompanying text (discussing Zinn).
121. See Hauk, supra note 94, at 76,943 (discussing securities advice that SEC considers
to place person in business of providing securities advice); Jack N. Alpern Co., L.P.A., supra
note 111 (same); Suzanne Clark-James, supra note 111 (same); see also Touche Holdings, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 30, 1987 (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (applying specific
investment advice test from Release 1092).
122. Suzanne Clark-James, supra note I11.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. In Suzanne Clark-James the SEC concluded that if a person discusses with
clients, other than on rare, isolated occasions, the advisability of investing in specific securities
or specific categories of securities, the person would be in the business of providing advice on
securities. Id. The SEC suggested bonds, mutual funds, and technology stocks as examples of
categories of securities. Id.
127. See Wallace E. Lin, SEC No-Action Letter, Apr. 15, 1985 (LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File) [hereinafter Wallace E. Lin] (manufacturer of strictly mathematical computer
software to assist investment brokers need not register under Advisers Act).
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investment decisions. 28 Lin insisted that he would have no knowledge of
particular stocks in which the buyers of his program might be interested
and that he would make no recommendations to buy or sell any stocks that
appeared on the program. 129 In considering whether Lin provided specific
investment advice, the SEC noted that only very general reports and analyses
do not constitute securities advice under the Advisers Act. 30 Because Lin
provided only general, readily-available securities data, the SEC concluded
that Lin did not provide investment advice that subjected him to the Advisers
Act's registration requirements. 3' The SEC's requirements of specific and
frequent investment advice, therefore, will exclude few persons from the
business of providing advice on securities within the meaning of the Advisers
Act. 132
Although the SEC in Release 1092 purports to clarify the business
element of the definition of an investment adviser, the Release provides
little additional guidance for practitioners attempting to determine whether

128. Id. In Wallace E. Lin Lin explained that his program consisted of a computer
diskette that contained data on approximately 1800 stocks listed on the New York and American
Stock Exchanges. Id.
129. Id. In Wallace E. Lin Lin noted that he attaches a disclaimer to each diskette stating
that the seller does not purport to recommend any security included in the program and that
the seller disclaims liability for any damages that buyers incur by relying on information in
the program. Id.
130. Id. According to the SEC a person may publish information on securities without
registering under the Advisers Act if anyone can easily obtain the information, the issuer did
not carefully select the categories of information included in the report, and the issuer did not
organize the information in a manner that suggests the purchase or sale of a particular security.
Id.
131. Id. The SEC contrasted the facts of Wallace E. Lin with another set of facts involving
a software manufacturer that produced a program similar to the program that Lin produced
on which the SEC based a refusal to issue a no-action position. See Computer Language
Research, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,185, at 76,753 (Dec 26, 1985) [hereinafter Computer Language] (refusing no-action position
to manufacturer of computer software for financial planners). In Computer Language the
manufacturer of a computer software package (CLR) asked the SEC to conclude that the
manufacturer was not engaging in the business of providing securities advice. Id. The software
that CLR manufactured processed personal financial and investment data that financial planners
provided and produced a financial plan to assist the planner in advising the client. Id. In
addition, CLR contemplated an arrangment with another manufacturer to link CLR's package
to a service that would allow subscribers to enhance the general financial plans that CLR's
package produced. Id. at 76,754-755. The enhanced plans would suggest specific categories of
investments to implement the general recommendations that CLR's package provided. Id.
The SEC suggested that CLR was in the business of providing securities advice. Id. at 76,757.
The SEC explained that unlike the manufacturer in Lin, CLR offered software that produced
personalized financial plans and contemplated offering an enhanced service that would provide
recommendations on specific categories of securities. Id. at 76,758; Wallace E. Lin, supra note
125 (program generated only general statistical report on securities). Because CLR offered
personalized, potentially specific advice concerning securities, the SEC declined issue a noaction position with respect to CLR's activities. Computer Language, supra.
132. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text (discussing large classes of persons
that provide specific investment advice).
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to register under the Advisers Act.'33 Except for the section covering the
business test, the language of Release 1092 is nearly identical to the language
of the release that Release 1092 supercedes. 13 4 The SEC even drew the
requirements that satisfy the business test directly from the Advisers Act
and from the previous release on the Advisers Act. 3 5 The SEC failed,
however, to include substantially clearer language or references to the noaction letters that the SEC has written since the previous release on the
36
issue of whether particular persons should register as investment advisers.
Nevertheless, additional references to no-action letters may not have clarified
thoroughly the definition of an investment adviser because in many of the
relevant no-action letters, the" SEC merely recites the statutory definition of
an investment adviser and instructs the inquiring party to apply the definition
to his particular activities. 37 Because Release 1092 only slightly modifies the
earlier SEC release on the definition of an investment adviser, persons who
misunderstood the definition before Release 1092 may find little additional
guidance in Release 1092.138

133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that in Release 1092 SEC followed
prior release in discussing first and third prongs of investment adviser test and modified only
second prong).
134. See supra notes 85-132 and accompanying text (discussing SEC test to determine
whether person is in business of providing securities advice); Rel. No. 770, supra note 85
(explaining first and third prongs of investment adviser test in language identical to Release
1092).
135. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (noting that term "holds himself out"
appears twice in text of Advisers Act); supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that
separate compensation criteria appeared in business test in prior release on scope of Advisers
Act); supra notes 117-132 and accompanying text (contrasting securities advice as first prong
of investment adviser test with specific investment advice as element of business test).
136. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text (noting that SEC drew language in
Release 1092 from prior release and from text of Advisers Act); supra note 7 and accompanying
text (noting that SEC has interpreted scope of Advisers Act through no-action letters and
releases).
137. See Alan P. Woodruff, SEC No-Action Letter, Aug. 20, 1987 (LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File) (instructing business and estate planning firm to apply section 203(b)(3)
exception to Advisers Act to firm's activities); David R. Markley, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb.
6, 1985 (LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File) (advising accountant to consider section 202(a)(11)(B)
exception to definition of investment adviser).
138. See American Society of CLU and ChFC, SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 29, 1988
(LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File) [hereinafter CLUJ (questioning whether Release 1092
included additional lawyers and accountants within definition of investment adviser). In CLU
the vice president and general counsel for a national organization of insurance and financial
service professionals (CLU) inquired about the internal consistency of Release 1092. CLU,
supra. While observing that many of the provisions in Release 1092 did not represent new
SEC positions, CLU questioned the SEC's interpretation in Release 1092 of the section
202(a)(11)(B) exception to the definition of an investment adviser. Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11)(B) (1982) (excluding from definition of investment adviser any lawyer, accountant,
engineer, or teacher whose performance of investment advisory services is solely incidental to
conduct of their principal occupation). CLU noted the SEC's statement in Release 1092 that
the section 202(a)(11)(B) exception does not exclude lawyers and accountants that hold
themselves out as financial planners. CLU, supra. CLU argued that a person that holds himself
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To clarify further the definition of an investment adviser in Release

1092 the SEC might have provided, in one document, explicit definitions
of terms that the SEC uses in the three-pronged investment adviser test and

in the business test and extensive citations to SEC materials that illustrate
those terms in practice. 39 Release 1092 plainly indicates, however, that the
SEC intends to construe broadly the statutory definition of an investment
adviser.t4' By construing the statutory definition broadly, the SEC advances
the Congressional policy of protecting investors by including a large group
of persons within the Advisers Act's registration requirements.1 4' Many

financial planners, however, hope to avoid the restrictions and registration
requirements that accompany status as an investment adviser by excluding

themselves from the definition of an investment adviser. 142 When deciding
whether to register under the Advisers Act, financial planners might avoid

confusion by recognizing the SEC's broad definition of an investment

adviser. 43 Unlike the SEC's prior release on the scope of the Advisers Act,
Release 1092 phrases the criteria that satisfy the business test as three active

requirements rather than three subjective characterizations of the financial
planner's business. 44 Any person who, in the most liberal sense, satisfies
the first and third prongs of the investment adviser test and engages in any
one of the criteria that satisfies the business test will receive no assistance

out as a financial planner need not register under the Advisers Act unless the person first
satisfies the three-pronged investment adviser test. Id. CLU suggested that Release 1092 indicates
that the SEC might require professionals that failed to satisfy the three-pronged investment
adviser test to register under the Advisers Act. Id.
The SEC responded that CLU erroneously interpreted Release 1092. Id. The SEC assured
CLU that no investment adviser that fails to satisfy all three prongs of the investment adviser
test needs to register under the Advisers Act. Id. According to the SEC a person need only
consider the exceptions to the definition of an investment adviser in section 202(a)(I1)(A)-(E)
if the person first qualifies as an investment adviser under the general definition. Id. The SEC
insisted, therefore, that Release 1092 does not include additional accountants, lawyers, or other
professionals within the Advisers Act's registration requirements. Id.
139. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text (discussing lack of clearer explanations
in Release 1092 of terms that SEC uses to determine whether person functions as investment
adviser).
140. See supra notes 6, 34-38 (noting SEC's broad interpretation of definition of investment
adviser).
141. See supra notes 2, 4, 9-17 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intention
to protect investors through Advisers Act's registration requirements).
142. See Linda Arnold, supra note 61 (requesting SEC advice on how to limit proposed
advisory activities to avoid Advisers Act's registration requirements); Richard K. May, SEC
No-Action Letter, Dec. 11, 1979 (LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File) (advising SEC that
applicant wished to minimize start-up costs and continuous filing requirements by avoiding
Advisers Act's registration requirements).
143. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (encouraging careful consideration of SEC's
inclusive definition of investment adviser); Estate Planners, supra note 6, at 45 (same).
144. See supra notes 85-132 (discussing criteria that satisfy business test under Advisers
Act); Kelvin, Are FinancialPlannersReally Underregulated?A Comprehensive Study Including
Recent Legal, Regulatory, and Industry Developments, 49 J. AM. Soc. C.L.U. 38, 39 (1986)
(noting that business test under SEC release that preceded Release 1092 focused on subjective
public perception of financial planner's activities).
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from the SEC in avoiding the Advisers Act's registration requirements. 45
In Release 1092 the SEC attempts to clarify the Advisers Act's definition
of an investment adviser.'" The greatest departure from earlier SEC releases
in Release 1092 is the SEC's explanation of the criteria that the SEC uses
to determine whether a person is in the business of providing securities
advice. 47 As the investment industry becomes more complex, the SEC's
broad interpretation of the definition of an investment adviser will necessarily encompass an ever-growing number of persons. 4s Accordingly, the
SEC continually will need to revise the terms of the Advisers Act so that
persons will be able to decide without an individual SEC explanation whether
49
the Advisers Act applies to their business activities.
ROBERT W. PONTZ

145. See supra notes 53-57, 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing criteria that SEC
considers in determining whether person must register under Advisers Act).
146. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's purpose in issuing
Release 1092).
147. See supra notes 85-132 (discussing factors that determine whether person is in business
of providing advice on securities under Advisers Act).
148. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing variety of services that
financial planners may offer).
149. See supra notes 53-57 (discussing factors SEC presently considers to determine whether
person functions as investment adviser).

